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ABSTRACT
Goal oriented methods have been successfully employed for
eliciting and elaborating software requirements. When goals
are assigned to an agent, they have to be operationalised :
the agent’s operations have to be refined, by equipping them
with appropriate enabling and triggering conditions, so that
the goals are fulfilled. Goal operationalisation generally de-
mands a significant effort of the engineer. Although there
exist approaches that tackle this problem, they are either in-
formal or at most semi automated, requiring the engineer to
assist in the process. In this paper, we present an approach
for goal operationalisation that automatically computes re-
quired preconditions and required triggering conditions for
operations, so that the resulting operations establish the
goals. The process is iterative, is able to deal with safety
goals and particular kinds of liveness goals, and is based on
the use of interpolation and SAT solving.
1. INTRODUCTION
Goal oriented methods (e.g., KAOS [12] and I∗ [26]) have
been developed and successfully applied to the problem of
eliciting and elaborating software requirements. Such meth-
ods typically demand the refinement of high level goals that
require agent cooperation to be achieved, into goals that can
be realised by individual agents [13]. A goal assigned to an
agent must be operationalised, i.e. mapped into operations
provided and executed by agents [15].
The problem of goal operationalisation has been studied
by various researchers. In the work of Letier and van Lam-
sweerde [15], a pattern based technique for deriving oper-
ational requirements from system goals is proposed. This
technique provides some templates to derive, from partic-
ular kinds of LTL goals (it imposes syntactic restrictions),
a set of required pre/triggering conditions for operations,
so that these entail the goals. More recently, Alrajeh et
al. proposed an approach for semi-automatically learning
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operational requirements from a set of goals [2]. This ap-
proach uses model checking for verifying that a given set
of operational requirements satisfies the goals. If verifica-
tion fails, the user examines the counterexample generated
by the model checker, identifies a wrongly executed opera-
tion, and provides positive scenarios illustrating “good” oc-
currences of this operation. These scenarios are then used
by an inductive learning engine to automatically compute
new required pre/triggering conditions for the selected op-
eration. The obtained operational requirements ensure that
the counterexample is avoided and the behaviour described
by the positive scenarios is preserved. The approach of Al-
rajeh et al. is semi-automated since it requires engineers’
intervention for providing positive scenarios.
In this work, we present an approach for goal operationali-
sation, that automatically computes required pre/triggering
conditions for operations, in order to fulfil a set of goals.
Moreover, this approach does not depend on user provided
scenarios and their characteristics, e.g., “richness” and cor-
rectness, as is the case with [2]. The refinement process is
based on the use of interpolation and SAT solving. As pre-
vious approaches [15, 2], our technique applies to safety and
the time progress goals. Moreover, we are also able to deal
with a wide range of liveness goals, namely, those captured
by the reactivity pattern [20]. Our approach starts with
a model checking phase, for verifying whether the opera-
tional requirements specification satisfies the goals or not.
If the verification is successful, then the operational specifi-
cation needs no refinement. If the model checker produces
a counterexample, an interpolant from the counterexample
and the violated goal is computed, which is exploited to
strengthen or weaken required preconditions and required
triggering conditions, respectively, to remove the counterex-
ample. The approach performs various logical checks for
ensuring that the refined required conditions are consistent
(in the sense of [15]) with the current operational specifica-
tion. These checks are performed using SAT solving.
An interpolant for formulas A and B whose conjunction
is inconsistent, is a formula that is implied by the first, is
inconsistent with the second, and is expressed in the lan-
guage common to A and B. Essentially, an interpolant for
a formula capturing a trace and a goal (which is violated) is
a property of the trace expressed in the language common
with the goal, which can be seen as an explanation of why
the trace violates the goal. As we will show, interpolants
can be used to refine required conditions, in the process of
goal operationalisation.
The remainder of this article is organised as follows: Sec-
tion 2 introduces preliminary concepts necessary in the pa-
per. Section 3 presents a running example, used to present
our approach. Section 4 describes our approach in detail, for
the operationalisation of safety and time-progress goals. Sec-
tion 5 extends the technique to deal with liveness goals. Sec-
tion 6 evaluates the approach, and compares with a closely
related one, on some case studies. Finally, we discuss related
work in Section 7, and present our conclusions in Section 8.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Labelled Transition Systems, FLTL and
Model Checking
Labelled Transition Systems (LTS) are typically used to
model the behaviour of interacting components [19]. For-
mally, an LTS P is a quadruple 〈Q,A, δ, q0〉, where Q is a
finite set of states, A is the alphabet of P , δ ⊆ Q×A∪{τ}×Q
is a transition relation, and q0 ∈ Q is the initial state. The
semantics of an LTS P can be defined in terms of its exe-
cutions, i.e., the set of event sequences that P can perform,
starting in the initial state and following P ’s transitions.
Fluent Linear-time Temporal Logic (FLTL) [10] is a vari-
ant of Linear-time Temporal Logic (LTL) [20][21], well suited
for describing properties of event-based discrete systems (e.g.,
LTSs) [19]. FLTL extends LTL by incorporating the pos-
sibility of describing abstract states called fluents, charac-
terised by events of the system. Formally, Fl = 〈IFl, TFl, B〉
defines a fluent Fl, where IFl, TFl ⊆ A and IFl ∩ TFl = ∅,
and B ∈ {true, false} indicates the initial value of Fl. When
any event in IFl occurs, the fluent starts to be true, and it
becomes false again when any event in TFl occurs. If the
term B is omitted then Fl is initially false.
A FLTL formula is an LTL formula where propositions are
fluents. Given a set Φ of fluents, a well-formed FLTL for-
mula is defined inductively using the standard boolean op-
erators and the temporal operators X (next) and U (strong
until), in the following way: (i) every fl ∈ Φ is a formula,
and (ii) if φ and ψ are formulas, then so are ¬φ, φ ∨ ψ,
φ ∧ ψ, Xφ, φUψ. We consider the usual definition for the
operators [] (always), <> (eventually) and W (weak until)
in terms of next and strong until, and boolean connectives.
Model checking [6] provides an automated method for de-
termining whether or not a property described by a (typi-
cally temporal) formula holds on the system’s state graph.
In our case, we will use Labelled Transition System Analyser
(LTSA), a verification tool for concurrent systems models.
A system in LTSA is modelled as a set of interacting finite
state machines (described by FSP processes [19]). LTSA
directly supports FLTL verification by model checking.
2.2 Interpolation
Given two sets A and B of formulas such that A ∪ B is
unsatisfiable (sets of formulas are interpreted as theories, i.e.,
their unsatisfiability corresponds to the unsatisfiability of
their conjunction), an interpolant for A and B is a formula I
such that: (i) I is true in all models of A, (ii) I is false in all
models of B, and (iii) I is in L(A)∩L(B), i.e., the common
language of A and B. For instance, consider A ≡ p ∧ q and
B ≡ ¬q ∧ r. Then, an interpolant for A and B is I ≡ q.
In this work, we use the MathSAT [4] constraint solver.
This tool is behind various tasks, such as finding operations
that lead to certain states, querying about operation en-
abledness, etc. Most notably, MathSAT is able to compute
interpolants, which is a crucial mechanism underlying our
approach. Although MathSAT is an SMT solver, we do not
make use for any of our case studies of the theories Math-
SAT is equipped with. That is, we are using the tool only as
a SAT solver (with interpolation computation capabilities).
3. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR
GOAL MODELS
Goals are properties that the system should achieve. A
goal model is an organisation of the goals through AND/OR
refinement links. Goal refinement ends when all subgoals
can be assigned to single agents. Agents perform opera-
tions, whose combined behaviours must fulfil the goals. Op-
erations characterise state transitions in the system. Each
operation is specified by its signature (input and output vari-
ables), the domain pre- and post-conditions (DomPre and
DomPost, respectively), and the required conditions. There
are three different types of required conditions. A required
precondition (ReqPre) captures permission: under this con-
dition the operation may be executed. A triggering condi-
tion (ReqTrig) captures obligation: under this condition the
operation must be executed. Finally, the required postcon-
dition (ReqPost) captures additional effects of executing the
operation. A goal is correctly operationalised by a set of
operations (operation model), if satisfying all required con-
ditions in the set guarantees the satisfaction of the goal [15].
As shown in [18], it is possible to systematically obtain a
behavioural model from an operation model. Requirements
can be expressed using FLTL, by combining the “always”
and “next” operators, to capture required conditions, and
introducing further FLTL constraints to cope with the syn-
chronous semantics of the KAOS operation model. Then,
an LTS that represents the system behaviour can be au-
tomatically constructed. Using this characterisation of the
operation model, a model checker (e.g., LTSA) can be em-
ployed to check if the system satisfies the goals, if these are
expressed as FLTL assertions [18].
Let us briefly describe an operation model for a Mine
Pump Controller, introduced in [11]. We use this model
as a running example throughout the paper, and in particu-
lar in this section as a motivating example. The Mine Pump
system controls an alarm and a water pump in a mine, de-
pending on different levels of methane in the environment,
and water in the mine. The system monitors three environ-
mental variables: Methane (indicating whether methane is
present in the environment), and LowWater and HighWater
(indicating the level of water in the mine is low or high, re-
spectively), and two software variables that are controlled
by the system: PumpOn and Alarm indicating whether the
water pump and the alarm are on or not, respectively.
The above mentioned monitored variables are modified by
environment events: belowLow, aboveLow, aboveHigh and
belowHigh modify the water level in the mine, while signal-
Methane and signalNoMethane change accordingly the pres-
ence of methane in the environment. The system may ac-
tively engage in the events switchPumpOn, switchPumpOff,
raiseAlarm and stopAlarm, in order to control the state
of the pump and the alarm (i.e., to change the values of
controlled variables PumpOn and Alarm). The initial specifi-
cation for the Mine Pump Controller’s operations is given
below. Initially, the operations are enabled as long as the
domain precondition is true (i.e., the required precondition
is true), and are not obliged to be executed in any state (i.e.,
the required triggering condition is false).
Operation switchPumpOn Operation switchPumpOff
DomPre !PumpOn DomPre PumpOn
DomPost PumpOn DomPost !PumpOn
Operation switchAlarmOn Operation switchAlarmOff
DomPre !Alarm DomPre Alarm
DomPost Alarm DomPost !Alarm
Consider a goal PumpOffWhenMethane stating that “when
methane is present in the environment, the pump must be
switched off”. In order to check whether our operation model
guarantees that this goal is achieved, the approach presented
in [18] may be followed. The specification is mapped into an
event-based transition system, and it uses a model checker
to check that the goals are satisfied. We express goals as
FLTL formulas, since we will use LTSA [19]. The above
goal is expressed in FLTL as follows:
[] (tick ->(Methane ->X (! tick W (tick && !PumpOn))))
The tick event is a means for capturing KAOS’ synchronous
interpretation of an operational model under an asynchronous
interpretation which is used in the LTSA [18]. The above
formula states that, if Methane is true when tick occurs,
then before the next tick the pump must be switched off.
Having the operation model captured as an LTS and goals
as FLTL formulas, it is possible to verify whether the spec-
ification meets the goals or not. In our case, the goals can
be violated, and the LTSA model checker produces the fol-
lowing counterexample:
Trace to property violation in PumpOffWhenMethane:
tick (s0)
signalMethane Methane
tick Methane (s1)
switchPumpOn Methane && PumpOn
tick Methane && PumpOn (s2)
By examining the above counterexample, one can realise
that state (s2) does not satisfy the goal PumpOffWhenMethane.
The problem has to do with the operation switchPumpOn
being able to occur when there is methane present in the
environment (notice that the required precondition allows
for this).
3.1 Using Interpolation for Refinement
The above counterexample can be expressed as a formula
A, where system states are represented by variables (one per
fluent in the specification), and these variables are replicated
3 times, for the 3 different states of the trace (i.e. s0, s1
and s2), relating each one with the next according to what
the corresponding event indicates. Suppose that the goal
can be expressed as a state property B (e.g., this is straight-
forward if the property is a safety property), referring to
the last state of the trace. Since the trace is a violation
of B, clearly A ∧ B is unsatisfiable. We can then try and
use interpolation, to see what the interpolant provides. In
this case, the interpolant is: Methane & PumpOn. This inter-
polant indicates that the problem is that in the last state
there is methane in the environment and the pump is on,
which causes a violation in the goal. Let us start going back
from the state previous to the last tick, trying to find the
first place where the violation might be avoided. We can
compute the weakest precondition of the interpolant with
respect to the last action, i.e., switchPumpOn, obtaining: WP
(switchPumpOn, Methane & PumpOn) = Methane.
Notice that this last operation has the ability to change
the truth value of the interpolant. Thus, by preventing its
execution, we can get rid of the previous counterexample.
We have to check, however, whether this action is obliged
or not to be taken, when Methane is present. This can be
checked using some decision procedure (e.g., SAT solving),
to decide the formula Methane ⇒ ReqTrig(switchPumpOn).
If it is the case, then the action cannot be prevented, and
we have to continue searching backwards in the counterex-
ample, for another way of removing the counterexample. If
it is not the case, we can get rid of the counterexample by
adding !Methane to switchPumpOn’s required precondition.
4. REFINING OPERATIONAL
REQUIREMENTS
Let us describe our approach for refining operational re-
quirements in more detail. For the sake of simplicity, we
assume that goals are safety properties. Later on we extend
the approach to deal with Time Progress (TP) and reactiv-
ity properties [20]. Given a set G = {G1, . . . , Gn} of goals,
and an operational requirements specification Spec that may
not satisfy G, we propose an iterative approach that refines
Spec by constructing new required pre/triggering conditions
for operations, such that the resulting refined specification
satisfies G. This approach can only refine Spec by weaken-
ing and strengthening required preconditions and required
triggering conditions of Spec’s operations, respectively.
The approach consists of two phases, that are depicted in
Fig. 1. The Model Checking phase is concerned with verify-
ing whether Spec satisfies the goals G or not. If the verifica-
tion is successful, then the requirements specification needs
no further refinement. If, on the other hand, the goals are
not satisfied by Spec, then the model checker detects a vio-
lation to at least one of the goals Gi, and produces a coun-
terexample as a witness of the violation. The Refinement
phase automatically refines the operational requirements so
as to prevent the detected violation from occurring. To
achieve this, the approach uses interpolation and starts com-
puting an interpolant from the counterexample trace and the
violated goal Gi. This interpolant is exploited, using weak-
est precondition computations, to identify operations whose
guarding conditions may be altered to get rid of the obtained
counterexample. More precisely, the obtained interpolant,
with the aid of weakest precondition, produces the formulas
to be used to strengthen or weaken required pre/triggering
conditions, respectively, to remove counterexamples.
The refined specification, that incorporates new “more
precise” required conditions for some operations, removes
from its behaviours the violation found before. The process
is repeated until no violation is detected, obtaining a valid
operationalisation for G, or until we reach a point in which
a violation cannot be eliminated, meaning that the found
violation cannot be removed by refining required conditions
of the current operational requirements specification.
4.1 Model Checking Phase
The LTSA model checker has been shown useful for analysing
operational requirements specifications against goal models
expressed in FLTL [18]. The state description of the system
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Figure 1: Overview of the iterative approach.
is given with fluent definitions (cf. Section 2). We follow
the approach presented in [18] for capturing KAOS opera-
tion models in LTSA, which makes use of a tick event to
explicitly represent the start and end of time intervals in
asynchronous FLTL. As an example, consider the following
goal for a model in which ticks are incorporated:
assert PumpOnWhenHighWaterANDNoMethane =
[](tick ->((HighWater && !Methane)
-> X(! tick W (tick && PumpOn))))
This formula expresses that, if at some time-point the level of
water is high and there is no methane, then the pump must
be switched on at the next time-point We can use LTSA for
checking if the given Mine Pump specification satisfies the
goals. Initially we consider the weakest required precondi-
tion (true) and the strongest required triggering condition
(false) for every operation. LTSA returns the following coun-
terexample for the goal PumpOnWhenHighWaterANDNoMethane:
Trace to property violation
in PumpOnWhenHighWaterANDNoMethane:
tick (s0)
aboveLow
tick (s1)
aboveHigh
tick HighWater (s2)
tick HighWater (s3)
Because of the way the property is expressed (in relation to
the tick event), the important states are those immediately
following tick events. This counterexample corresponds to
a case in which (s2) starts with the water pressure being
high, no methane in the environment and the pump off, and
by the next time-point the situation has not changed and
the pump remains off.
4.2 Refinement Phase
The counterexamples generated by the model checker are
used to automatically and iteratively compute refinements
during the goal operationalisation process, which are guar-
anteed to remove the detected counterexamples.
Suppose we obtain a counterexample trace T , violating a
particular goal Gi. If we build a formula FT capturing trace
T , and a formula FGi capturing the fact that Gi holds at
the last state, clearly FT ∧FGi is unsatisfiable. We can then
produce an interpolant I from these formulas, that provides
a condition, in the intersection of the languages of the trace
and the goal, whose validity leads to the goal violation. In-
tuitively, as long as we do not get rid of the property I, we
will not be able to stop violating the goal Gi, i.e., I is a
property of the trace T (it is implied by it), which implies
the negation of the goal Gi. Notice that calculating the in-
terpolant I is, in some sense, a form of generalisation. The
interpolant allows us to obtain a weaker “counterexample”
than T , a condition reachable from the initial state which
leads to the violation of a goal (notice that solely by remov-
ing I, we do not guarantee the satisfaction of Gi, but not
removing it guarantees its violation).
A counterexample may be removed either by prohibit-
ing the occurrence of an operation from certain states (i.e.,
strengthening the operation’s required precondition) or by
forcing an operation to occur in certain states (i.e., weak-
ening its required triggering condition). The approach is
concerned with automatically detecting which of the above
cases is necessary, and using the interpolant to produce a
change in the corresponding condition. In the process of
refining required conditions of an operation model using in-
terpolants, weakest preconditions play an important role.
Strengthening Required Preconditions
By processing the counterexample trace backwards from the
last tick, we can compute the weakest precondition of the
interpolant with respect to the last operation, trying to find
the first place where the violation might be avoided. Let
I be the interpolant and T = a1; a2; . . . ; ak the counterex-
ample trace. We can have two situations with respect to
WP(ak, I) = I
′, the weakest precondition of the last opera-
tion and the interpolant. If ¬(I ′ ⇒ I), then by forbidding
ak to occur when I
′ holds, by adding ¬I ′ to the required
precondition of ak, we get rid of this counterexample, and
contribute to stop violating Gi. This can be done as long
as it does not contradict ak’s required triggering conditions,
(i.e., if the operation is not obliged to be executed when I ′
holds). If I ′ ⇒ I, then by preventing ak from occurring
we do not stop violating the goal, since I still holds. In this
case, as well as when adding ¬I ′ to the required precondition
would contradict other conditions of ak, we have to continue
searching backwards in the trace, to try to find an operation
whose occurrence causes the satisfaction of the interpolant,
and which can be “removed” from the trace.
Consider, for instance, the following counterexample, vi-
olating PumpOffWhenLowWater:
Trace to property violation in PumpOffWhenLowWater:
tick LowWater (s0)
switchPumpOn LowWater && PumpOn
tick LowWater && PumpOn (s1)
In this case switchPumpOn is the only non-tick operation
executed, whose current required precondition and required
triggering condition are true and false, respectively. The
interpolant in this case is: LowWater & PumpOn. Going back-
wards from the last tick, we compute the weakest precon-
dition of this interpolant with respect to the last non-tick
operation, switchPumpOn, obtaining LowWater. Notice that
¬(LowWater⇒ LowWater & PumpOn). Then, it is possible to
falsify the interpolant by preventing switchPumpOn from oc-
curring when LowWater. This is achieved simply by adding
¬LowWater to the required precondition of switchPumpOn,
as long as this does not contradict the operation’s required
triggering condition. We then modify the required precon-
dition of switchPumpOn, which now becomes ¬LowWater.
In the process just described, we have to perform various
logical checks, namely checking whether a weakest precondi-
tion implies or not an interpolant and if a new conjunct of a
required precondition does not contradict a required trigger-
ing condition. We perform these checks using SAT solving.
In the particular case of checking whether a new identified
conjunct for a required precondition contradicts or not a
required triggering condition, we consider the formula:
ReqTrig.condition ∧DomPre.condition⇒ ReqPre.condition (1)
which must always hold (it is a meta-rule of the KAOS lan-
guage [13]). Notice that an operation is able to execute only
when its domain precondition holds. Then, if by modifying
a required precondition adding a new conjunct we violate
this property, we conclude that the conjunct is contradic-
tory with the current required triggering condition or the
domain precondition.
Weakening Required Triggering Conditions
In the above described situations, a counterexample is re-
moved by preventing an operation that appears in the trace
from occurring. In other situations, the solution to remove
the counterexample cannot be given in terms of preventing
an operation from occurring, but instead in terms of forcing
an operation that did not occur, to occur when it has to, i.e.,
by weakening the operations required triggering condition.
Let T = a1; . . . ; ai; tick; aj ; . . . ; an be the counterexample
trace and I the interpolant computed for this counterexam-
ple. Suppose that we cannot get rid of this counterexam-
ple by strengthening some operation in aj ; . . . ; an. Then,
as each operation in {aj , . . . , an} cannot be prevented from
occurring, we will try to remove the counterexample by forc-
ing an operation to occur. Notice that the operation to be
triggered, say at, must meet two conditions.
First, at should be able to be executed in a state that
satisfies I, i.e., the following condition has to hold:
I ⇒ DomPre(at) ∧ ReqPre(at). (2)
Second, in order to remove the counterexample, at’s execu-
tion must falsify the interpolant I, i.e, the following condi-
tion has to hold:
(I ∧X DomPost(at))⇒ X¬I (3)
We evaluate every operation at not occurring in aj ; . . . ; an,
checking whether it meets both of the above conditions or
not. If we find such an operation at, we refine its required
triggering condition, as follows:
ReqTrig(at) = ReqTrig
pre(at) ∨ I
where ReqTrigpre(at) is at’s current required triggering con-
dition. Notice that adding the disjunct I to at’s required
triggering condition does not violate the KAOS meta-rule (1),
since at satisfies condition (2).
If no operation satisfies conditions (2) and (3), we proceed to
look deeper in the counterexample trace T , going backwards
from ai, and using I
′ = WP(aj ; . . . ; an, I) instead of I.
Consider, for instance, the counterexample to the goal
PumpOnWhenHighWaterANDNoMethane, presented in Section 4.1.
The interpolant in this case is: !Methane & HighWater &
!PumpOn. Notice that in this case, no operation is executed
between the last two tick events. We have then to check if
there exists an operation that satisfies conditions (2) and (3).
Operation switchPumpOn is executable when !Methane &
HighWater & !PumpOn, and it falsifies this interpolant. In-
deed, notice that, considering that ¬LowWater and false
are switchPumpOn’s current required precondition and re-
quired triggering condition, respectively, the following for-
mulas, corresponding to conditions (2) and (3), hold:
!Methane & HighWater & !PumpOn⇒ !PumpOn & !LowWater (4)
(!Methane & HighWater & !PumpOn) &
(PumpOn’ & Methane’=Methane & HighWater’=HighWater) (5)
⇒ ¬(!Methane’& HighWater’ & !PumpOn’)
Then, switchPumpOn’s required triggering condition is re-
fined as follows:
ReqTrig(switchPumpOn) = !Methane & HighWater & !PumpOn
As for the case of strengthening required preconditions, weak-
ening required triggering conditions also involves logical checks.
We perform these logical checks using SAT solving.
4.3 Iterative Refinement
The two phases described above correspond to a single
iteration of the refinement approach. These phases are iter-
atively applied until no further violations are detected in the
model checking phase, i.e., until a specification that satisfies
the goals is reached, or until we reach a point from which, by
solely refining required preconditions and required triggering
conditions, the goals cannot be achieved.
Let O and G be the initial operational specification and
a set of goals, respectively, consistent with respect to a set
of fluents D. Let us now argue about the correctness, com-
pleteness and termination of the approach.
Correctness and((((
((Completeness
When the approach finishes and the outcome is an opera-
tional specification Spec = O ∪ REQ, where REQ is the
set of required pre/triggering conditions refined to fulfil the
goals in G, REQ is guaranteed to be a consistent extension
to O that correctly operationalises the goals in G. This is
formalised as follows:
O ∪Req ∪G 6|=D false O ∪Req |=D G
Due to space restrictions, the proof of this claim is not re-
ported here. The justification has to do with each refine-
ment in the process being guaranteed to be sound, thanks
to the SAT checks we perform. For instance, in the case
of strengthening a required precondition, the validity of the
condition (1) ensures that the new required precondition
does not contradict the current required triggering condi-
tion. In addition, conditions(2) and (3), in the case of weak-
ening a required triggering condition, ensure that the KAOS
meta-rule (1) is not violated.
However, the proposed approach does not satisfy com-
pleteness. That is, if there exists a refinement (modifications
to the required conditions) that can satisfy the set of goals,
then the approach might fail in the process of finding that
refinement. The main reason is related to the the fact that
goals can be competing, i.e., trying to fulfil one goal may
prevent us from later on fulfilling another goal. Then, by
removing a counterexample the approach can remove edges
from the system’s behaviour that later could be required to
be added to remove another counterexample (notice that we
cannot add edges, since postconditions are not modified, nor
new states are added, since the definition of variables, what
defines the state space, is not altered).
Termination
As we have argued during the presentation of the refinement
phase, a refinement step removes the counterexample from
which the refinement was constructed, in the sense that the
same execution cannot be obtained. However, there might
be other traces violating the same goal that led to an al-
ready removed counterexample. Then, let us argue about
termination of the iterative refinement process when deals
with safety goals.
The model checking phase constructs a labelled transi-
tion system corresponding, essentially, to formula O ∧ ¬G.
If this formula has satisfying traces, these are counterexam-
ples. First, notice that the labelled transition system O∧¬G
is finite: it has a finite number of states, and of course a finite
number of edges. We have to demonstrate that each refine-
ment of required conditions removes at least one transition,
since there exists the risks of adding redundant conjunct-
s/disjuncts, which would not remove any edge.
We have explained that, when a required precondition is
added, it is because an operation a has been identified, which
is executable in a pre-state satisfying I ′, leading to a post-
state in which a formula I holds (the interpolant). Moreover,
this action a and condition I ′ come from a counterexample,
indicating that I ′ is a reachable condition, where a can be
executed. Then, when we add ¬I ′ to the required precondi-
tion of a we remove this particular transition.
By weakening required triggering conditions, we also re-
move edges. When a required triggering condition is added,
it is because an operation a has been identified, which is exe-
cutable in a state satisfying I, the interpolant, and whose ex-
ecution falsifies the interpolant. Notice then that, by weak-
ening the triggering condition for a, we remove transitions
corresponding to tick. Indeed, while tick was executable in
the state satisfying I, it is no longer executable in that same
state due to the obligation of executing a instead. Thus,
again the refinement produces an edge removal.
Since the number of edges corresponding to O ∧ ¬G is
finite, and we alter this transition system only by deleting
edges, it is guaranteed that our refinement process termi-
nates when it deals with safety goals.
5. DEALING WITH LIVENESS PROPERTIES
5.1 Time Progress Property
In discrete-time systems, a common desired property is
the progress of the time, usually specified as []<>tick. This
property is called Time Progress (TP) and is a particular
kind of progress property. In this section, we show how the
approach can be extended to operationalise this particular
progress property.
In order to detect progress violations, we take into account
three assumptions: (i) KAOS’ semantic preservation: all
initiating and terminating fluent events can occur only once
between ticks; (ii) Maximum Progress (MP) assumption: a
common assumption in reactive systems that gives priority
to system events over all other events including ticks; and
(iii) Safety Guaranteed: we do not want to interfere in the
satisfaction of the safety goals to operationalise the time
progress property. So, the checking is performed over the
system that represents the composition of all domain/re-
quired conditions and the safety goals.
Time Progress violations are traces in which at some point
s0 sl sk
e0 ek−1
ek
Figure 2: Counterexample for reactivity properties.
no tick event can be executed. Then, provided that we have
a finite number of events, and due to assumption (i), which
prohibits the repetition of events between ticks, these TP vi-
olations will be deadlocks. Basically, the main reason lead-
ing to these deadlocks is the way used for specifying the
properties, i.e., the goals should be satisfied in the states in
which tick occurs. Then, the non-progress of tick is due to
the fact that its execution will violate a goal, contradicting
the assumption (iii).
So, our the approach to remove progress violations con-
sists of extending the obtained counterexample trace with
a tick event at the end, and proceeding to compute an in-
terpolant for the extended counterexample and the safety
goals (that will not hold in the last state due to tick is now
being executed). Intuitively, this interpolant explains the
reasons why tick does not progress, and gives us a reachable
property of the system that should be removed in order to
contribute with the the satisfaction of the safety goals and
the time progress property. To remove this counterexample,
we follow the technique just presented in Section 4.
5.2 Reactivity Liveness Properties
Liveness properties have been used for reactive systems
extensively, e.g., in the work of Manna and Pnueli [20]. In
the context of goal oriented methods, liveness properties are
typically restricted to bounded liveness. For instance, Letier
argues in [16] that responsiveness properties for systems
[](trigger -> <>response) (where response is controlled by
the software-to-be and trigger is monitored by the system-
to-be) should be bounded, since otherwise agents may post-
pone their duties indefinitely, without a finite observable vi-
olation. However, it is sometimes convenient for these kinds
of properties to abstract away the bound (because it is un-
known, or because the bound, if large, may make the sys-
tem state space explode as the time units must be explicitly
counted in the model). When properties are further away
from the “machine/world” interface or encompass many in-
teractions between the world and the machine (think of
chained responsiveness patterns) properties such as ([]<>As
-> []<>G) allow abstracting away from the bounded be-
haviour that the system will have to achieve the goal.
In is then, in our opinion, worthwhile to deal with live-
ness in goal operationalisation. Our approach considers live-
ness properties that match the reactivity pattern ([]<>As
-> []<>G), where As and G are non-temporal fluent ex-
pressions. This pattern is general enough to embrace many
liveness properties [20]. Moreover, it gives us information
about the shape of the counterexample, which gives us the
opportunity to use interpolation (see Fig. 2).
Liveness properties corresponding to the reactivity pat-
tern have two parts: the antecedent or assumptions (As),
and the consequent or goals (G). A violation of a property
of this kind consists of a prefix (finite part) leading to a loop
in which the antecedent is satisfied, but not the consequent.
That is, at least one state sl . . . sk in the loop satisfies the
assumptions As, but no state satisfies the goal G. In order to
compute an interpolant for this counterexample, we encode
the reactivity goal in the following propositional formula:
P = (
k∨
i=l
Asi)⇒ (
k∨
j=l
Gj)
where the expression F i means that F holds in si. Let FT
be the formula that characterises the counterexample trace,
clearly FT ∧ P is unsatisfiable. Then, we can calculate an
interpolant I for these formulas. This interpolant is a weaker
representation of the loop part that explains what is wrong
in the loop. To remove this counterexample, we search for
an operation at that can be executed at some point in the
loop, such that its execution reaches a states that does not
satisfy the interpolant (i.e., “breaks” the loop).
si ⇒ DomPre(at) ∧ ReqPre(at) (6)
(si ∧X DomPost(at))⇒ X¬I (7)
If we find such an operation that satisfies both (6) and (7),
then we refine at’s triggering condition with the conjunction
of its required precondition and the negation of the goal:
ReqTrig(at) = ReqTrig
pre(at) ∨ (ReqPre(at) ∧ ¬G)
Notice that we do not refine a new triggering condition based
on the interpolant. Worse, we may produce triggering con-
ditions that are weaker than needed. Still, we can guarantee
that the approach is correct and consistent with respect to
the operations’s preconditions (including their previous re-
finements). So, the overall refinement process would first re-
move time-progress violations, second operationalise safety
goals, and finally deal with liveness goals.
6. CASE STUDIES
In this section, we report the experimental results of ap-
plying our approach to two case studies, namely the Mine
Pump Controller [11] and the Engineered Safety Feature Ac-
tuation System (ESFAS) [17]. For the case of safety goals
and the time progress property, our approach is compared
with the ILP-based framework introduced in [2], for eval-
uation and validation purposes. One of the authors pro-
vided the positive scenarios needed for ILP-based frame-
work. These were produced manually following the guide-
lines provided in [1]. This human intervention, however, was
not required in our proposed approach since it is fully au-
tomated. On the other hand, previous approaches to goal
operationalisation do not deal with liveness goals, so we do
not have previous results to compare with, to validate the
technique. We argue about this problem later on in this
section.
Each case study is accompanied by an informal descrip-
tion of the system-to-be, a partial operational requirements
specification, and a set of goals specified in FLTL. These
are available from https://sites.google.com/a/dc.exa.
unrc.edu.ar/icse2014-case-studies/.
6.1 Mine Pump Controller
This first case study was used as the running example in
this article (refer to Section 3 for details). In addition to the
already specified goals for the Mine Pump Controller system
(Sections 3 and 4), we consider extra objectives that should
be achieved by the system:
assert PumpOffWhenLowWater =
[] (tick ->(LowWater ->X (! tick W (tick && !PumpOn))))
assert AlarmWhenMethane =
[] (tick ->(Methane ->X (! tick W (tick && Alarm))))
We have already discussed earlier in the article, in the
form of examples, various refinements performed to the mine
pump’s operational requirements (e.g., operation switchPumpOn
is refined with additional required pre/triggering conditions
in Sections 3.1 and 4.2). Let us see now how we remove time
progress violations. By performing a TP progress check on
the Mine Pump system, considering the needed assumptions,
LTSA produces the following counterexample.
TP violation. Trace to DEADLOCK:
tick
switchPumpOn
raiseAlarm
aboveLow
signalMethane
Extending the counterexample with a tick event at the end,
and computing the interpolant, we obtain: PumpOn & LowWater.
It exhibits a similar violation to the goal PumpOffWhenLowWater
shown in subsection 4.2, where we get rid of this coun-
terexample prohibiting the execution of switchPumpOn when
LowWater (refinement (T1)). We follow the approach put
forward in [1], which proposes removing first time progress
violations and then safety violations.
We now present a summary of the iterations performed
by our refinement process, in which each iteration indicates
the required condition identified to be added to the oper-
ational specification. Required preconditions (T1)-(T4) re-
move time progress violations, and the required triggering
conditions (T5)-(T8) guarantee the satisfaction of the safety
goals.
ReqPre(switchPumpOn) = !LowWater (T1)
ReqPre(stopAlarm) = !Methane (T2)
ReqPre(switchPumpOn) = !Methane (T3)
ReqPre(switchPumpOff) = !(!Methane & HighWater) (T4)
ReqTrig(raiseAlarm) = !Alarm & Methane (T5)
ReqTrig(switchPumpOn) = !PumpOn & !Methane & HighWater (T6)
ReqTrig(switchPumpOff) = PumpOn & LowWater (T7)
ReqTrig(switchPumpOff) = PumpOn & Methane (T8)
When compared with the requirements learned by the ap-
proach presented in [2], for this same case study, we observe
that both approaches iterate exactly the same number of
times. Both approaches produce the same required condi-
tions, except for the required triggering condition produced
in the sixth iteration. The ILP-based framework learns a
weaker triggering condition for switchPumpOn, namely High-
Water. Due to this overgeneralisation problem of ILP, the
learned condition leads to the following deadlock in the sys-
tem:
Trace to DEADLOCK:
tick (s0)
aboveLow
tick (s1)
aboveHigh
signalMethane
tick (s2)
belowHigh
signalNoMethane
The deadlock is produced because in the state (s2), both
HighWater and Methane are true. Then, the required precon-
dition from (T3) indicates that switchPumpOn cannot occur
when Methane, but the learned triggering condition obliges
switchPumpOn to occur when HighWater. In our case, the
required triggering condition refined in (T6) is stronger, re-
quiring methane to be false when the water level is above
high. On the other hand, to remove the deadlock, the ILP-
based framework is forced to backtrack to previous itera-
tions and requires the engineer to provide further scenarios
or manually produce the refinement.
With respect to running times, it is worth mentioning
that, for this case study, our approach is significantly more
efficient. While the ILP-based framework requires aprox. 29
seconds per iteration, our approach takes slightly less than
1 sec. per iteration.
6.2 ESFAS
The Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ES-
FAS) was originally introduced by Courtois and Parnas in
[5]. Later on, Letier reported a KAOS specification of this
system in [17]. The ESFAS system of a nuclear power plant
prevents or mitigates damage to the core and coolant sys-
tem of the plant, on the occurrence of a fault such as a loss
of coolant. ESFAS monitors the water pressure, and a cou-
ple of switches for blocking and resetting, and it controls a
single boolean variable, indicating whether the safety injec-
tion system is on or off, with the events sendSignal and
stopSignal. Basically, the system must start safety injec-
tion when the pressure becomes too low. In addition, the
system can be “disengaged” via the switches, indicating that
its actions are overridden (overrideSignal, enableSignal).
The goals that ESFAS has to satisfy are formalised in FLTL
as follows:
assert SafetyInjectionWhenLowWaterPressureAndNotOverridden =
[] (tick ->(PressureBelowLow && !Overridden
-> X (! tick W (tick && SafetyInjection))))
assert SIEnabledWhenPressureAbovePermitOrManualReset =
[] (tick ->( (Occurs_reset || PressureAbovePermit)
-> X (! tick W (tick && !Overridden))))
assert SIOverriddenWhenBlockSwOnAndPressureLessThanPermit =
[] (tick ->(Occurs_block && !PressureAbovePermit
-> X (! tick W (tick && Overridden))))
Intuitively, the first goal indicates that the safety injec-
tion signal should be ‘On’ when the water pressure is below
the ‘Low’ level and the safety injection is not overridden
(this is the main objective of the ESFAS). The second goal
expresses that the safety injection should become enabled
when the water pressure raises above ‘Permit’ level or when
the reset button is pushed. And the third goal establishes
that the safety injection should become overridden when the
block switch is set to ‘On’ and the water pressure is lower
than ‘Permit’ level. The following fluent definitions are con-
sidered for the ESFAS system:
fluent Overridden = < overrideSignal, enableSignal, True>
fluent SafetyInjection = < sendSignal,stopSignal >
fluent PressureBelowLow =
< lowerPressureBelowLow, raisePressureAboveLow, True>
fluent PressureAbovePermit =
<raisePressureAbovePermit, lowerPressureBelowPermit>
fluent Occurs_block = < block,tock >
fluent Occurs_reset = < reset,tock >
Event tock is executed immediately after tick. This aux-
iliary event is introduced as a terminating action for the op-
erators’ press-button actions (the actions corresponding to
the system operator pressing the reset and block buttons).
We assume true and false to be the initial required precon-
ditions and the required triggering conditions for the opera-
tions, respectively. In addition, we consider the next domain
preconditions for the controlled operations and two environ-
mental assumptions to indicate that the operator cannot
press the reset and block buttons at the same time:
DomPre(overrideSignal) = !Overridden
DomPre(enableSignal) = Overridden
DomPre(sendSignal) = !SafetyInjection
DomPre(stopSignal) = SafetyInjection
Assumption 1 = [](tick & Occurs_block -> !Occurs_reset)
Assumption 2 = [](tick & Occurs_reset -> !Occurs_block)
The process checks the validity of the TP property, and re-
fines 4 conditions to remove the violations.
ReqPre(stopSignal) = !(!Overridden & PressureBelowLow) (R1)
ReqPre1(overrideSignal) = !Occurs_reset (R2)
ReqPre2(overrideSignal) = !PressureAbovePermit (R3)
ReqPre(enableSignal) = (R4)
!(!PressureAbovePermit & Occurs_block)
Now, the approach starts the refinement process of Section 4
in order to fulfil the safety goals. The first counterexample
that LTSA reports is:
Trace to property violation in
SafetyInjectionWhenLowWaterPressureAndNotOverridden:
tick PressureBelowLow (s0)
tock PressureBelowLow
tick PressureBelowLow (s1)
This counterexample corresponds to a case in which the
water pressure is below low and the system is not over-
ridden, and in the next time-unit the safety injection sig-
nal is off. The process continues by computing an inter-
polant for the counterexample and the violated goal, obtain-
ing !SafetyInjection & !Overridden & PressureBelowLow.
The weakest precondition of this interpolant with respect to
the last non-tick operation (i.e., tock), leads us to the same
formula (the interpolant). So, by preventing tock from oc-
curring we do not stop violating the goal. Thus, our ap-
proach attempts to remove the counterexample by forcing
the occurrence of an operation such that the operation’s ex-
ecution avoids the interpolant. Operation sendSignal meets
the two conditions for required triggering condition refine-
ment, namely:
I ⇒ !SafetyInjection ∧ true (A)
(I ∧ SafetyInjection’ ∧ (Overridden′ = Overridden)∧ (B)
(PressureBelowLow′ = PressureBelowLow))⇒ ¬(I′)
where I represents the above mentioned interpolant. Con-
dition (A) ensures that sendSignal can be executed when
!SafetyInjection & !Overridden & PressureBelowLow, while
condition (B) ensures that sendSignal’s execution avoids
the interpolant. Then, by forcing sendSignal to occur when
!SafetyInjection & !Overridden & PressureBelowLow, the
counterexample is removed. The fifth iteration finishes re-
fining sendSignal’s required triggering condition (R5):
ReqTrig(sendSignal) = (R5)
!SafetyInjection & !Overridden & PressureBelowLow
ReqTrig1(enableSignal) = Overridden & Occurs_reset (R6)
ReqTrig2(enableSignal) = Overridden & PressureAbovePermit (R7)
ReqTrig(overrideSignal) = (R8)
!(!PressureAbovePermit & Occurs_block)
The refined required conditions of subsequent iterations
(R5)-(R8) of our process guarantee the satisfaction of the
safety goals. Notice that, for example in (R5), !Safety-
Injection is redundant in sendSignal’s required trigger-
ing condition, since !SafetyInjection is the domain pre-
condition of sendSignal. The approach guarantees that
overrideSignal’s required triggering condition (R8) does
not contradict overrideSignal’s required preconditions (R2)
and (R3), thanks to the first environment assumption, which
expresses that Occurs_block ⇒ ¬Occurs_reset. A simi-
lar argument is valid for justifying that enableSignal’s re-
quired triggering conditions (R6) and (R7) do not contra-
dict enableSignal’s required precondition (R4), in this case
thanks to the second assumption.
The operational requirements specification obtained by
the above requirements achieves the ESFAS goals, so our
process successfully terminates.
Comparison with other Operationalisations.
When compare our approach with the ILP-based frame-
work [2], the first difference shows up in the fifth iteration.
The ILP-based framework removes the same counterexam-
ple, but due to the problem of overgeneralisation of this
approach, it produces a weaker required triggering condi-
tion for sendSignal: PressureBelowLow (i.e., rather than
!Overridden & PressureBelowLow). This condition forces
sendSignal to occur when the water pressure is below the
low threshold regardless of whether it is overridden or not.
In the sixth and seventh, both approaches produce the
same required conditions. In the eighth iteration however,
a second difference is detected. The ILP-based framework
learns a weaker triggering condition for overrideSignal,
namely Occurs_block. This learned required condition pro-
duces a deadlock in the system, for similar reasons to Mine
Pump example. To remove the deadlock, the ILP-based
framework requires the engineer to backtrack to previous it-
erations and either manually refine the required conditions
or provide further positive and negative scenarios, and rerun
the operationalisation process.
Let us compare the running times of our approach with
those of the ILP-framework. Since both approaches use
LTSA, the critical part in time is interpolation plus SAT
vs. inductive learning. In the case of ILP, the time in-
creases from 6 seconds in the first iteration to 18 seconds
in the eighth, because the set of examples gets bigger (the
engineer accumulates the positive scenarios from each itera-
tion). Our approach takes, again slightly less than 1 second
per iteration.
6.3 Analysing Reactivity Properties
Previous approaches to goal operationalisation do not deal
with liveness goals, so we do not have previous results or
case studies to compare with, to validate our technique. In
particular, Letier’s patterns based approach classifies these
goals as unrealizable [16]. So, the specifications that we use
as case studies (MinePump, ESFAS) do not have liveness
goals assigned to agents, to be operationalised.
We then developed some liveness goals that, based on the
knowledge we have on the case studies, should be satisfied,
although these do not appear explicitly in the specifications.
In addition, we do not use fairness assumptions, and we have
to assume certain liveness constraints on the environment
(e.g. if the pump is On, eventually the level of the water
is not high), and to remove some safety goals that imply
our developed properties, so that liveness counterexamples
emerge.
As we explained in Section 5.2, our approach considers
liveness properties that match the reactivity pattern ([]<>As
-> []<>G). This pattern is general enough to embrace many
liveness properties [20], and it gives us information about the
shape of the counterexample, which gives us the opportunity
to use interpolation.
For the Mine Pump Controller, the introduced property
is: “If infinitely often there is no methane (so the pump can
be turned On), then infinitely often the level of the water is
not high.” We specify this property as:
[](PumpOn -><>!HighWater) && []<>!Methane ->[]<>!HighWater
In order to obtain a counterexample for this goal, we remove
safety goals that lead to required conditions (T4) and (T6).
Then, a counterexample for the goal is obtained, which has
the following loop:
Violation of LTL property: @LivenessGoal
Trace to terminal set of states:
...
signalMethane HighWater && Methane
Cycle in terminal set:
tick HighWater && Methane (s3)
signalNoMethane HighWater
tick HighWater (s4)
signalMethane HighWater && Methane
Notice that (s3) is the state in the loop that satisfies the
assumption !Methane, but neither (s3) nor (s4) satisfy the
goal !HighWater. Then, the interpolant computed for this
counterexample is the following:
(HighWater3 & Methane3 & !PumpOn3)
& (!Methane4 & HighWater4 & !PumpOn4)
This interpolant explains what is wrong in the loop. So as to
remove this counterexample, we search for an operation that
can be executed at some point in the loop, such that its exe-
cution reaches a states that does not satisfy the interpolant.
switchPumpOn meets these two conditions. Then, the refine-
ment weakens the switchPumpOn’s required triggering con-
dition with the conjunction of its required precondition and
the negation of the goal, which correctly operationalises the
goal.
ReqTrig(switchPumpOn) = !Methane & !LowWater & HighWater (L1)
For ESFAS system, the developed property is: “If in-
finitely often the user does not override the system press-
ing the block button, then infinitely often the level of coolant
won’t be low”. For this case, the property to operationalise
is:
[](SafetyInjection ->!PressureBelowLow) &&
[]<>!Occurs_block ->[]<>!PressureBelowLow
The counterexample found for this goal is:
Violation of LTL property: @LivenessGoal
Trace to terminal set of states:
...
tick PressureBelowLow
Cycle in terminal set:
tock PressureBelowLow
tick PressureBelowLow
Then, the refinement process computes an interpolant and
weakens the required triggering condition for sendSignal
operation (in this case, weaker than (R5)), which correctly
operationalises the goal.
ReqTrig(sendSignal) = !!PressureBelowLow (L2)
7. DISCUSSION AND RELATED WORK
Goal-oriented requirements engineering (e.g., KAOS [12]
and I∗ [26]) has been the focus of much research in the re-
quirements engineering community. An important aspect of
this approach to requirements engineering is the notion of
relating high-level goals achievable only through agent coop-
eration with lower level goals that can be assigned to specific
agents, some of which may be software to be built. Support
for refining goals has been studied extensively too (e.g. [3]).
Goal operationalisation aims to produce requirements on a
per-operation basis that will be provided by a specific agent
to guarantee it achieves a goal that has been assigned to it.
Approaches concerned with goal operationalisation are for
instance the NFR framework [22] and CREWS [25]. How-
ever, these either focus on non-functional requirements or
are informal and hence cannot be fully verified. More for-
mal approaches such as [8, 9] allow checking the correctness
of operationalisation rather than supporting the elaboration
of such operational requirements.
The use of generalisation techniques in the context of goal
models is not novel. For instance, [14] presents a method
for inferring declarative assertions from scenarios. It elicits
goals from tailored scenarios provided by stake-holders using
an inductive inference process based on Explanation-Based
Learning (EBL) [23]. Apart from not being used specifi-
cally for operationalisation, the learning in [14] cannot con-
sider existing knowledge (e.g. existing goals or operational
requirements) during the inference process. Hence it is un-
sound and can produce inconsistent specifications.
Interpolation has been used for software analysis purposes,
notably by McMillan, in combination with SAT-based model
checking, for circuit verification [24]. It has also been em-
ployed for automated counter-example guided abstraction
refinement [7]. Essentially, interpolation is used in the con-
text of the verification of abstract (imprecise) models. When
a counterexample is obtained, it must be checked whether
it is an actual counterexample or its due to the imprecision
of the model. If it is spurious, then when building the con-
junction of the model and the counterexample, one arrives to
an unsatisfiable formula. Interpolation explains what is the
difference between the abstract and concrete models of the
system, that led to the spurious counterexample. The in-
terpolants obtained can be made part of the abstract model
to make it more concrete, and thus get rid of the spurious
counterexample. This process is iterated until no further
counterexamples are obtained or a real (non spurious) coun-
terexample is produced. In this work, we proposed using
interpolation for a different purpose. Basically, from con-
crete counterexamples showing goal violations we produce
unsatisfiable formulas so that interpolants can be computed.
These interpolants are used to refine the concrete operation
model. As opposed to abstraction refinement, in our set-
ting we do not have a model of reference to be used for
refinement (the concrete model in the context of abstrac-
tion refinement); instead, we have an objective, namely to
correctly and completely operationalise the goals. The de-
viation from the objective is what guides our process in the
use of interpolation, for refining the operation model.
There exist other approaches that deal with the problem
of goal operationalisation systematically. As mentioned in
Section 1, the approach introduced in this article is more
closely related to the framework presented in [2], which pro-
vides a semi-automated method that uses model checking for
analysing goal achievement and Inductive Logic Program-
ming (ILP) for learning operational requirements. There
are some important differences between the two approaches.
[2] requires user intervention to provide positive scenarios
for the learning phase and hence its results are dependent
on the correctness and ‘richness’ [1] of the scenarios given,
whereas this is not required by our presented approach. [2]
uses ILP which searches for the ‘most compressed’ condi-
tions (i.e., fewest number of fluent literals appearing in the
required conditions) and hence is prone to generating over-
generalised conditions. The approach introduced in this ar-
ticle, on the other hand, uses interpolation, which produces
more precise conditions, as the interpolant is necessarily im-
plied by the counterexample trace and it necessarily leads
to a violation of a goal. Exactly because of this, interpola-
tion based refinement may require more iterations to reach
a valid operationalisation, compared to the ILP approach.
Finally, our approach is able to deal with a wide range of
liveness properties, which are not handled by previous ap-
proaches to goal operationalisation.
8. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We presented an approach for goal operationalisation, that
automatically computes required pre/triggering conditions
for operations, in order to fulfil a set of goals. Moreover,
this approach does not depend on user provided scenarios
and their characteristics, e.g., “richness” and correctness, as
is the case with [2]. This approach is based on interpolation
and SAT solving, and applies to safety goals and particular
kinds of liveness goals, namely reactivity properties (a gen-
eral class that embraces many liveness properties). We have
developed some case studies, and compared our approach
with that of [2], showing that in these cases our approach is
able to produce goal operatinalisations effectively and more
efficiently.
There are various lines for future work. First, we plan to
carry out further larger case studies, that may enable us to
evaluate possible scalability issues with our approach to goal
operationalisation. In addition, we plan to investigate what
is the precise relationship between operationalisations ob-
tained by interpolation and those obtained by inductive logic
programming. In particular, we are interested in analysing
a possible notion of “most general” operationalisation, and
to assess whether interpolation based refinement enable us
to reach such operationalisations. Finally, we plan to in-
vestigate a potential complementation of interpolation and
inductive logic programming, for goal operationalisation.
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